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I. Introduction 
Recent years have witnessed the accelerated growth of 
a rich variety of personalized information systems (PISs) 
of unprecedented sophistication, which have been 
integrating seamlessly into our daily lives. Examples of 
these systems comprise personalized Web search and 
news, resource tagging in the semantic Web and 
multimedia recommendation systems. The key enabling 
technology of such systems is personalization, a 
research area that has received great attention lately 
and whose aim is to tailor information-exchange 
functionality to the specific interests of their users. To 
accomplish this functionality, most personalized 
information systems capitalize on, or lend themselves 
to, the construction of profiles, either directly declared by 
a user, or inferred from past activity, not only of the user 
in question, but also from the profiles of users with 
whom social relationships are known to the information 
system.  
Personalized services therefore allow users to deal 
with the overwhelming overabundance of information, 
but inevitably at the expense of privacy, especially when 
profiling is conducted across several information 
systems. Besides, the enrichment of these services with 
data from social networks creates additional 
opportunities with respect to information sharing but, at 
the same time, increases the user privacy risks. Figure 1 
shows an example of user profile modeled as a list of 
categories of interest.  
II. Measuring the Privacy of User Profiles 
A variety of privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs) 
have been proposed to enable the provision of new 
services and functionalities aimed at mitigating those 
privacy threats. Unfortunately, these technologies have 
not yet gained wide adoption. This is because it remains 
unclear whether their overall benefits outweigh their 
typically costly deployment and/or integration, as well as 
the operational cost that arises due to the fact that PETs 
typically come with penalties in terms of utility and 
performance, when compared to more privacy-invasive 
alternatives [1]. Assessing the privacy provided by a 
PET is, therefore, crucial to both determine its overall 
benefit and compare its effectiveness with other 
technologies. In other words, privacy metrics, 
accompanied with utility metrics, provide a quantitative 
means of contrasting the suitability of two or more 
privacy-enhancing mechanisms. 
Building upon well-established principles of 
information theory and statistics, we make a first 
contribution in this direction by proposing Kullback-
Leibler (KL) divergence as a criterion for quantifying the 
privacy of user profiles. Our metric, which encompasses 
Shannon’s entropy as a special case, is examined, on 
the one hand, under the beautiful perspective of the 
method of types and large deviation theory, and on the 
other, under Jaynes’ rationale behind entropy-
maximization methods. The proposed privacy measure 
contemplates a user profile modeled as a normalized 
histogram of user data, e.g., tags, ratings or queries, 
across a predefined set of categories of interest. In 
addition, we consider two distinct adversary models–an 
attacker aimed at targeting users who deviate from the 
average profile of interests; and another attacker whose 
objective is to classify a given user into a group of users. 
III. Privacy-Enhancing Technologies in Personalized 
Information Systems 
Equipped with a quantitative measure of privacy and 
utility, we investigate PETs providing hard privacy. By 
hard privacy, the privacy research literature refers to the 
case in which users mistrust communicating entities, 
e.g., the personalized information provider or the 
network operator, and thus strive to reveal as little 
private information as possible. This is in contrast to 
those privacy-preserving systems that build upon the 
assumptions of soft privacy, what means that users 
entrust their private data to these systems, which are 
therefore responsible for the protection of their data. 
Under the assumptions of hard privacy, this thesis 
contemplates two conceptually-simple strategies that 
capitalize on the principle of data perturbation. First, we 
consider the suppression of tags in the scenario of the 
semantic Web, and secondly, the combination of the 
forgery and suppression of ratings in personalized 
recommendation systems. Figure 2 provides a depiction 
of one of these approaches. Specifically, we illustrate 
the case of tag suppression, whereby users may wish to 
refrain from tagging certain resources. In doing so, the 
actual user profile  , that is, the profile capturing the 
user genuine interests, is observed from the outside as 
a perturbed profile; we refer to this profile as the 
apparent user profile  . Consequently, the adoption of 
our approach enables users to avoid being accurately 
profiled by the service provider, or in general, by any 
attacker capable of collecting the tags posted by users.  
Our second strategy contemplates the submission 
of false information, together with the aforementioned 
suppression technique, but in the scenario of 
recommen-  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Example of user profile, as shown by Google [2]. The 
interest of this user in the categories highlighted in red might 
reveal she is pregnant or planning to get pregnant. If this 
information ended up in the hands of her employer, her job 
might be at risk. 
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Figure 2. Tag suppression in the semantic Web. 
 
recommendation systems. More precisely, in our 
approach, users rate items, e.g., movies, music or 
books, as they normally do. However, when their privacy 
is being compromise, users may want to submit some 
ratings to items that do not reflect their actual interests. 
IV. On the Trade-Off between Privacy and Utility 
By adopting our strategies, users enhance their privacy 
to a certain extent, without having to trust an external 
entity or the network operator. Nevertheless, this is 
inevitably at the expense of a loss in data utility. For 
example, in the case of tag suppression, privacy comes 
at the cost of a degradation in the semantic functionality 
of the Web, since tags has the purpose of associating 
meaning with resources. On the other hand, the forgery 
and suppression of ratings in recommendation systems 
come with penalties in terms of the accuracy of the 
prediction generated by the recommender. In a nutshell, 
data-perturbative mechanisms pose an inherent trade-
off between privacy and utility. 
One of the objectives of this thesis is precisely to 
investigate the trade-off posed by such PETs. For this 
purpose, first we formulate mathematically the 
compromise between these two contrasting aspects; 
and secondly we tackle the issue in a systematic fashion 
by applying the methodology of multiobjective 
optimization. Our extensive theoretical analysis includes 
a close-form solution to the mathematical problem of tag 
suppression on the one hand, and to the problem of the 
forgery and suppression of ratings on the other. In 
addition, we characterize the optimal trade-off between 
the aspects of privacy and utility. Figure 3 illustrates the 
trade-off between privacy, measured as the Shannon 
entropy of the apparent user profile     , and the tag 
suppression rate        , i.e., the proportion of tags a 
user is willing to eliminate. Figure 4 shows the contours 
of the function modeling the trade-off among privacy 
risk, forgery rate   and suppression rate    
 
 Figure 3. Privacy-utility trade-off in tag suppression. 
V. Experimental Evaluation of our Privacy-
Enhancing Technologies 
Having investigated the privacy-utility trade-off posed by 
such PETs, we study the impact of those mechanisms 
on a real world application scenario. In particular, we 
assess the level of privacy attained by those users 
suppressing tags, and also how this mechanism may 
affect a parental control filter that enforces blocking 
conditions on resources (e.g., Web pages, videos or 
pictures), on the basis of the tags associated with them. 
More accurately, we contemplate an enhanced 
collaborative tagging system that consists of a 
“traditional” bookmarking service, such as Delicious 
(http://delicious.com), and two main additional services 
built on top of it. Such services address two main 
issues. The former allows users to specify certain 
policies to control the access to the browsed data, and 
the latter features our tag suppression mechanism. 
Our experimental evaluation shows how our PET 
allows users to enhance their privacy to a certain extent. 
In addition, we assess the impact that suppression has 
on utility, by considering the percentage of tags that 
each bookmark loses as a result of elimination of tags. 
Lastly, we quantitatively evaluate the degradation in the 
classification of Web content, in terms of false 
negatives, false positives, precision and recall. Our 
results indicate that our technique does not have a 
significant impact on the accuracy of a parental control 
filter. 
Figure 4. We measure privacy risk   as the KL divergence 
between the apparent user profile  , resulting from the addition 
of false ratings and the suppression of genuine ratings, and the 
population’s distribution of ratings  , that is,      ‖    This 
figure plots the contours of the privacy risk function for different 
values of forgery rate   and suppression rate  . 
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